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Does Europe Need Neutrality? 
The Old Continent in Search of Identity 
Andrea Pin∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most debated issues that European legal thinkers are 
tackling is surely the place that “neutrality” has in the field of 
constitutional theory, state-religion relationships, and human rights.1 
This is an extremely hot issue across the Old Continent. A vast 
portion of European legal culture thinks that neutrality2 is needed to 
protect religious freedom for all, as well as to protect human rights 
from threats that derive from religious extremism: believers, 
nonbelievers and democracies alike would be protected by 
neutrality.3 
Some European states are debating or have already legislated in 
this field in recent years. For example, due to its national version of 
neutrality, France prohibited the use of ostensible religious symbols 
at schools4 and, later, the use of the complete Muslim veil in public 
places.5 Along similar lines, Switzerland passed a constitutional 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Comparative Public Law, University of Padova (Italy). The 
author is deeply grateful to the International Center for Law and Religion Studies for inviting 
him to its 2013 Symposium and especially to Brett Scharffs and Cole Durham, and wishes to 
thank Mark Hill QC, Mark Movsesian, and Enzo Pace for their extremely insightful comments 
and suggestions. Special thanks go also to James Heilpern. The author welcomes comments at 
andrea.pin@unipd.it. 
 1. J. HABERMAS, FATTI E NORME. CONTRIBUTI A UNA TEORIA DISCORSIVA DEL 
DIRITTO E DELLA DEMOCRAZIA 363–66 (L. Ceppa ed., Guerini e associati 1996) [hereinafter 
CONTRIBUTI].  
 2. See, e.g., J. BAUBÉROT & M. MILOT, LAÏCITÉS SANS FRONTIÈRES (2011;); L. 
ZUCCA, A SECULAR EUROPE (Oxford University Press, 2012) [hereinafter SECULAR EUROPE]; 
CONTRIBUTI, supra note 1, at 366. 
 3. BAUBÉROT & MILOT, supra note 2, at 76. 
 4. LOI 2004-228 du 15 Mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le 
port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et 
lycées publics [Law 2004–228 of March 15, 2004 Regulating, in Accordance with the 
Principle of Secularism, the Wearing of Symbols or Clothing Denoting Religious Affiliation in 
Schools, Colleges and Public Schools], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190. 
 5. LOI 2010-1192 du 11 Octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans 
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referendum banning the establishment of Minarets,6 
notwithstanding the fact that religious freedom policies in 
Switzerland are generally left to cantons, not to the Federation.7 
Italy had to deal with state neutrality when a case about the display 
of the crucifix in public school classrooms was brought before 
domestic courts and, later, before the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECtHR”).8 
The issue of neutrality goes beyond the state level. It has been 
precisely because of the ECtHR’s case law that neutrality has become 
part of the framework of the European Convention of Human 
Rights: the ECtHR has used the neutrality principle in many 
situations concerning disparate cases such as conscientious 
objections9 or religious communities’ autonomy.10 
But in a broader sense, the doctrine of neutrality has also 
significantly influenced the European Union. It was especially 
influential when members of the European Union discussed whether 
they should explicitly mention Europe’s religious roots in the 
preamble of what should have been the European Constitution but 
later became a less daring European Treaty.11 The use of neutrality 
therefore encompasses the whole spectrum of the relationship 
between religion and human rights, including the place that religion 
has in the public place, the relationship between democracy and 
 
l’espace public [Law 2010–1192 of October 11, 2010 Prohibiting the Concealment of the 
Face in Public Space], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010. 
 6. The referendum, which was held November 29, 2009, amended article No. 72 of 
the Swiss Constitution, introducing the following amendment atto the third paragraph: “The 
construction of minarets is prohibited.” CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] 
Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 72, ¶ 3 (Switz.). 
 7. CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 
72, ¶¶ 1–3 (Switz.) (“The regulation of the relationship between the church and the state is 
the responsibility of the Cantons. The Confederation and the Cantons may within the scope of 
their powers take measures to preserve public peace between the members of different religious 
communities. The construction of minarets is prohibited.”). 
 8. Lautsi v. Italy App. No. 30814/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) (summarizing the Italian 
domestic decisions in this topic). 
 9. See, e.g., Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 23459/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011). 
 10. See, e.g., Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99 Eur. 
Ct. H.R (2001). 
 11. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, A Christian Europe? Europe and Christianity: Rules of 
Commitment, 6 EUR. VIEW 1, 143–50 (2007). 
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religion, the rights of believers, freedom from religion for 
nonbelievers, and autonomy of religious groups.12 
One thing can be stated clearly from the very beginning, the 
enforcement of neutrality doesn’t come at a cheap price, as recent 
pieces of state legislation demonstrate. Neutrality can be very 
demanding, both for religions and for human rights, as proven by 
the French prohibition of the Muslim veil and of religious symbols. 
It is not by chance that such enforcement of neutrality in France has 
ignited religious conflicts in that country,13 rather than extinguishing 
them.14 
The task of this Article is precisely to highlight some of the 
reasons for which neutrality has become common currency in 
European legal thinking. For these reasons, the Article first sketches 
in Part I, the fields in which neutrality appears to play a major—and 
sometimes unpredictable—role. More precisely, it first focuses on the 
European Convention of Human Rights, its wording, and the 
ECtHR’s case law (Part I.A); then it considers the debate about the 
preamble of the proposed Constitution of the European Union15 
(Part I.B); and it briefly summarizes the evolution of some states that 
have embraced neutrality (Part I.C). Then it explores the reasons for 
which neutrality is oftentimes invoked, mostly at a supranational 
level, and links this phenomenon to the characters of European 
societies (Part II). Finally, it briefly explores the difficulties as well as 
 
 12. B. MASSIGNON & V. RIVA, L’EUROPE, AVEC OU SANS DIEU? HÉRITAGES ET 
NOUVEAUX DÉFIS 269 (Les Editions de L’Atelier-Fidélité, 2010). 
 13. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United States and 
France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 479 (2004). 
 14. See the caseload that the ECtHR has come to face after France passed the 2004 
piece of legislation banning the use of religious symbols at school; Dogru v. France, App. No. 
27058/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); Kervanci v. France, app. n, App. No. 31645/04 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2004); Ghazal v. France, App. No. 29134/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Jasvir Singh v. 
France, App. No. 25463/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Ranjit Singh v. France, App. No. 
27561/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Hatice Bayrak v. France, App. No. 14308/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2009); Mahmud Sadek Gamaleddyn v. France, App. No. 18527/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); 
Tuba Aktas v. France, App. No. 43563/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 
43835/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014). 
 15. The drafted Constitution never entered into force; however, almost all its provisions 
later became the body of the so-called Lisbon Treaty, signed December 13, 2007. Treaty of 
Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon], available at 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0001:0010:EN:PDF (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2013). 
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the implications of preferring the paradigm of “pluralism” instead of 
neutrality (Part III). 
The hypothesis of this Article is that neutrality is expected to fill 
a vacuum in the constitutional identity of contemporary Europe and 
to give shape to a new society. Neutrality is not just a common 
standard for religious freedom’s protection; it is also a tool that is 
used to legitimize European legal and political culture and to shape 
European society. The European trend towards neutrality is backed 
by fear that the relationship between religion and human rights can 
be conflictive and the belief that human rights can flourish only if the 
two are kept separate. 
It must be noted that it is extremely hard to follow all the 
nuances of the word neutrality, and especially to distinguish 
neutrality from “secularism.”16 Neutrality is oftentimes described in 
relation to secularism,17 and even some opinions of the ECtHR use 
neutrality and “secularism” interchangeably.18 But scholars and 
judges diverge in interpreting them as synonymous or as different 
but related concepts. Also, “secularism can be understood in many 
different ways; it is constitutional doctrine, a philosophical stance, a 
worldview, and ideology, and even an extreme stance in the hands of 
scientists who see religion as the archenemy.”19 A debate about the 
use of the word neutrality tends to become a debate about its very 
meaning20 or about its hostile or friendly implications for religious 
freedom;21 but this is not the debate this paper addresses. This 
Article therefore adopts an introductive and minimalist 
understanding of neutrality. This understanding is that neutrality is a 
state’s attitude that in order to protect the religious freedom of 
 
 16. Rex Ahdar, Is Secularism Neutral?, 26 RATIO JURIS 3, 404 (2013); BAUBÉROT & 
MILOT, supra note 2, at 151. 
 17. MASSIGNON & RIVA, supra note 12, at 269. 
 18. See Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (Tulken, J., 
dissenting) (stating that she “fully and totally subscribe[s]” to the principles of secularism and 
equality). “Secularism” is actually said to be a feature of Turkish constitutionalism, not of the 
European Convention. 
 19. Lorenzo Zucca, Lautsi: A Commentary on a Decision by the ECtHR Grand 
Chamber, Icon 111 INT’L J. CONST. L. 218, 222 (2013) [hereinafter ECtHR Grand 
Chamber].  
 20. Rafael Palomino, Religion and Neutrality: Myth, Principle, and Meaning, 2011 BYU 
L. REV. 657, 657 (“Neutrality faces [the] danger of turning into an ‘empty’ signifier, or, 
alternatively, a word too ‘full’ of meanings.”). 
 21. Id. at 678. 
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believers and nonbelievers, the state must not take a position in favor 
of or against any religious view.22 
I. THE DEBATE OVER NEUTRALITY IN EUROPE: AN OVERVIEW 
Neutrality is used at different levels of legal thinking and legal 
practice. This Section highlights the most authoritative and 
influential means of human rights’ protection in Europe at the 
supranational level, namely the ECtHR. Then it considers the debate 
about the religious nature and roots of the European Union. Lastly, 
it briefly sketches how some national legal cultures—France, Italy 
and Spain—that are characterized by a common linguistic heritage as 
well as by a historically vibrant dialogue23 have shaped similar 
concepts of neutrality, albeit with uncertain results. 
A. The Need for Neutrality in the European Court of Human Rights’ 
Case Law 
The affirmation of neutrality in the decisions of the ECtHR is 
highly relevant. It has become the most powerful and effective 
institution patrolling the respect of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (“Convention”) and securing fundamental liberties 
among the members of the Council of Europe, which now includes 
forty-seven member states. The ECtHR was meant to provide 
European states with a common frame of basic liberties they were 
expected to protect24 after the horrible violations of human rights 
and dignity that devastated the continent during the first half of the 
twentieth century. The main influence was eminently political at first. 
In a nutshell, it was based on the premise that “[w]hen governments 
know that policies must be justified in an international forum[,] an 
additional element enters their decision-making.”25  
In few words, the ECtHR’s case law has distilled the principle of 
neutrality as a duty of the state to remain impartial in the field of 
religion in order to establish equal freedom of religion and of 
 
 22. MASSIGNON & RIVA, supra note 12, at 269; ZUCCA, supra note 2, at xxi. 
 23. The relationship between language, communication, and political and institutional 
dialogue has been notoriously explored by JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Beacon Press, 1981).  
 24. J.C. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2d ed., 1995). 
 25. Id. at 1. 
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conscience.26 Interestingly, though, Article 9 of the Convention, 
which is the relevant provision as to religious freedom’s rights, does 
not mention neutrality in any way. It provides as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Nor does article 14, which focuses on the prohibition of 
discrimination, mentions neutrality: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status. 
 
 26. Hasan v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 78 (2000); Refah Partisi v. 
Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 91 (2003); 
Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98, par. Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 49 (2010); Leyla Sahin v. 
Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 107 (2005); Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia 
v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99 Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 123 (2001); Griechische Kirchengemeinde 
Munchen und Beyern E.V. c. Allemagne, App. No. 52366/99 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007); Sevgi 
Kurtulmus v. Turkey, App. No. 65500/01, par. Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 2 (2006); 97 Members of the 
Gidani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Georgia, App. No. 71156/01 par. Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 131 (2007); Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia , App. No. 72881/01 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61 (2006); Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, App. No. 77703/01 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 113 (2007); Kuznetsov v. Russia, App. No. 184/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 74 
(2007); Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, App. No. 302/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶  99 
(2010); Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, App. No. 18147/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 72 
(2007); Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 23459/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 120 (2011); Hasan and 
Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, App. No. 1448/04 ¶ 54 (2007); Kervanci v. France, App. No. 
31645/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 (2004); Mirolubovs v. Latvia, App. No. 798/05, par. Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 80 (2009); Sinan Isik v. Turkey, App. No. 21924/05, par. Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 45–46 
(2010); Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 (2008); Gatis Kovalkovs v. 
Latvia, App. No. 35021/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶  57 (2012); Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶  60 (2011); Jakobsky v. Poland, App. No. 18429/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 44 
(2010); Ghazal c.v. France, App. No. 29134/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Sidincatul “Pastorul 
Cel Bun” v. Romania, App. No. 2330/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 136 (2013); Fernández Martínez v. 
Spain, App. No. 56030/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 128 (2014). 
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Therefore, the ECtHR has utilized the principle of neutrality as a 
hermeneutical device to enforce the principle of religious freedom, 
although the Convention doesn’t command that the states be 
neutral in order to protect religious freedom. 
Some doubts can be cast on this interpretation of religious 
freedom that includes neutrality. Such doubts arise from a historical 
consideration of the framing of the conventional text (which I will 
consider in Part I.A.1), from the utility of using neutrality as an 
instrument that would be able to shed a light on cases before the 
Court (Part I.A.2), and from the scattered states’ opposition to the 
use of neutrality made by the ECtHR (Part I.A.3). 
1. The framing of art. No. 9 
Article 9 does not say anything about neutrality as we have seen 
above. Moreover, records about the drafting of the Convention do 
not lead to the conclusion that the drafters intended the wording of 
the article to imply the principle of neutrality.27 At the time of its 
framing, the state parties debated about the breadth of religious 
liberty as well as about its limits, but they did not debate a state’s 
duty to be neutral towards religion in order to protect human rights. 
On the contrary, Turkey wanted Article 9 to be flexible enough 
to allow state institutions to intervene to protect democracy and 
fundamental liberties against Islamic fundamentalists that supposedly 
threatened Turkey’s republicanism.28 Sweden insisted that the 
wording had to allow states with an established church to preserve 
their own regimes; Sweden was formally Lutheran and did not want 
to find itself in violation of religious freedom as enshrined in the 
Convention because of this affiliation.29 
The example of Sweden is significant. Sweden was but one of the 
many European countries that could not call itself neutral at the time 
the Convention was drafted: Sweden had a clear religious view.30 
 
 27. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Travaux Préparatoires to the Convention, 
http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_TravPrep_Table_ENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 
2014). 
 28. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, European Commission of Human Rights Preparatory Work on 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (http://www.echr.coe.int/library/
DIGDOC/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-ART9-DH(56)14-EN1338892.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 
2013). 
 29. Id. at14. 
 30. MASSIGNON & RIVA, supra note 12, at 269. 
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And this is still true for many countries. England has Anglicanism as 
its established church;31 Greece is formally Orthodox;32 Scandinavian 
countries have, or used to have an, established church;33 Italy went 
through a long era before leaving the establishment behind in 
1984;34 Ireland is Christian according to its constitutional 
preamble;35 the Constitution of Switzerland opens with an 
invocation to God.36 
Therefore, there is no apparent reason for reading art. No. 9 of 
the Convention as commanding state neutrality.37 If neutrality means 
state impartiality towards any religion, such that the state may have 
no religious views, then many of these states are or used to be not 
neutral. Had such states intended to implement neutrality through 
framing or joining the European Convention, they would have 
named themselves as plain violators of the Convention. In fact, this is 
what Sweden feared at the time the Convention was being worded. 
Therefore, an analysis of the wording and history of art. No. 9 of the 
Convention does not help define the reasons for which leading cases 
decided by the ECtHR actually used the concept of neutrality. On 
the contrary, the wording and history of art. No. 9 could have 
discouraged the ECtHR from using the concept of neutrality. 
 
 31. Act of Supremacy (1534), available at http://www.britainexpress.com /History / 
 tudor/supremacy-henry-text.htm. 
 32. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 2 (Greece). 
 33. KONGERIGET NORGES GRUNDLOV [CONSTITUTION] May 17, 1814, art. 4 (Nor.) 
(“The King shall at all times profess the Evangelical-Lutheran religion.”). The Lutheran 
Church was the established religion of Sweden until 2000. See Maari Jänterä-Jareborg, 
Religion and the Secular State in Sweden, RELIGION AND SECULAR ST.: INTERIM REPS., 669, 
669 (Int’l Ctr. for Law and Religion Studies, 669) http://www.iclrs.org/
content/blurb/files/Sweden.1.pdf. Finland has special provisions for the Lutheran Church in 
its Constitution. See Suomen perustuslaki [Constitution] June 11, 1999, § 76). As for 
Denmark, see Danmarks Riges Grundlov [Constitution] June 5, 1953 § 6. 
 34. The Constitutional Court’s decision no. 203 of 1989 clarified that Catholicism was 
not the official religion of the state anymore, after the Lateran Pacts had been deeply modified 
in 1984. Corte Cost., 12 aprile 1989, n. 203, GU n.16 del 19-4-1989 (It.), available at 
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/vediMenuHTML?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=198
9-04-19&atto.codiceRedazionale=089C0422&tipoSerie=corte_costituzionale&tipoVigenza=
originario. 
 35. It runs as follows: “In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority 
and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred.” Ir. Const., 
1937, pmbl. 
 36. “CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 
72, ¶ 3 (Switz.) (“In the name of Almighty God!”). 
 37. But see Jeroen Temperman, Are State Churches Contrary to International Law?, 2 
OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 119, 121 (2013). 
DO NOT DELETE 8/12/2015 10:26 AM 
605 Does Europe Need Neutrality? 
 613 
Moreover, the Turkish and Swedish examples also tell us 
something more. The two countries recognized that there could be a 
tension between the human rights they were protecting through the 
Convention, and their country’s prevailing religious or anti-religious 
attitudes. Turkey wanted to protect human rights, perhaps even at 
the expense of religion. Sweden meant to protect its establishment of 
religion, even at the expense of human rights. But they did not 
resolve to strike a balance between religious freedom and human 
rights through neutrality. 
2. The equivocal use of neutrality in the ECtHR’s decisions 
Neutrality was not included in the Convention, but the ECtHR 
through its decisions later implemented it. If neutrality lies outside of 
the perimeter of religious freedom as enshrined in the conventional 
text, the ECtHR has inferred that art. No. 9 requires it. In several 
pivotal cases that the ECtHR has decided, religious freedom is 
undoubtedly an “asset” for democratic societies, and not just for 
believers; religious freedom requires that the state keep a neutral 
approach where neutrality is oftentimes placed alongside religious 
“pluralism.”38 The role of the state would consist in preserving 
religious pluralism and granting as much freedom for religion and 
human rights as possible, and this could be done only through state 
neutrality. This reading of art. No. 9 interprets the Convention as a 
living instrument39 and not as a text that needs to be understood in 
an originalist40 or textualist41 fashion. The wording of article 9 would 
be just the beginning of a long path that has led the meaning of the 
 
 38. Hasan v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 76 (2000); Dahlab v. 
Suisse, App. No. 42393/0898 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 
44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 104 (2005); Kuznetsov v. Russia, App. No. 184/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
¶ 54 (2007); 97 Members of the Gidani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Georgia, 
App. No. 71156/01Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 132 (2007); Sinan Isik v. Turkey, App. No. 21924/05 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 45 (2010); Bayatyan v. Armenia App. No. 23459/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 119 
(2011).; Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, App. No. 302/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 99 
(2010); Mirolubovs v. Latvia, App. No. 798/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 80 (2009); Dogru v. France, 
App. No. 27058/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 (2008); Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. 
Russia, App. No. 72881/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61 (2006). 
 39. See, e.g., Vo v. France, App. No. 53924/00 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 82 (2004) (stating that 
the European Convention is a “living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions.”). 
 40. On originalism, see, among many, ORIGINALISM. A QUARTER-CENTURY OF 
DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed., Regnery 2007). 
 41. Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005). 
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Convention to encompass state neutrality. 
The practice of assuming the Convention to include the state’s 
duty of neutrality has led to a problematic line of case law that has 
failed to establish a useful standard for interpreting difficult cases. 
Sometimes, neutrality has been used to depict the state’s role in 
preserving religious communities’ autonomy. For instance, the 
ECtHR censored the Bulgarian42 and Moldovan43 attempts to 
control Islamic and Orthodox communities’ affairs. Sometimes the 
Court has legitimized restrictions on religious practices. Notably, it 
allowed Turkey to forbid the use of hijab in universities, and 
Switzerland and France to forbid the same garment for 
schoolteachers44 and students.45 In other decisions, it was used both 
to censor and to legitimize official religious symbols in the name of 
human rights. The Lautsi case46 is extremely relevant in this respect. 
The first decision, which was released by a section of the ECtHR 
(Lautsi I), decided that the presence of the crucifix in Italian public 
classrooms was inconsistent with the state’s duty of neutrality;47 the 
final decision, which was made by the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber 
(Lautsi II), decided that state neutrality allows the display of official 
religious symbols.48 Interestingly, the two decisions diverge in their 
outcomes, but both use neutrality to scrutinize the relevant Italian 
legislation. One could wonder why Lautsi II decided to uphold the 
presence of the crucifix based on the same rationale of state 
neutrality that Lautsi I offered.  
 
 42. Hasan v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000). 
 43. Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99 Eur. Ct. H.R 
(2001). 
 44. Dahlab v. Suisse, App. No. 42393/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001). 
 45. Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); Kervanci v. France, 
App. No. 31645/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004); Ghazal v. France, App. No. 29134/08 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2009); Jasvir Singh v. France, App. No. 25463/08 Eur. Ct. H.R.(2009); Ranjit Singh 
v. France, App. No. 27561/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Hatice Bayrak v. France, App. No. 
14308/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Mahmud Sadek Gamaleddyn v. France, App. No. 18527/08 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Tuba Aktas v. France, App. No. 43563/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009). 
 46. It was decided also on the basis of Additional Protocol of the Convention, which, in 
art. No. 2, commands that “[n]o person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise 
of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall 
respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their 
own religious and philosophical convictions.” Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11 Art. 2 , Council of 
Europe, Nov. 1, 1998, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/009.htm.  
 47. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 57 (2009). 
 48. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 72 (2011). 
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On one hand, it is understandable why the use of neutrality by 
the ECtHR is so nuanced and hardly predictable:49 it has to conform 
to state constitutional systems that diverge deeply, and 
“accommodate a variety of national church-state arrangements, 
including establishments.”50 In some sense, the ECtHR has to find a 
way to make neutrality virtually fit with France and its separation of 
church and state,51 as well with England, whose Head of State is the 
Supreme Governor of the Anglican community.52 And the ECtHR is 
aware of this, having stated that when “questions concerning the 
relationship between State and religions are at stake, in which 
opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role 
of the national decision-making body must be given special 
importance.”53 
On the other hand, one can wonder why the ECtHR insists in 
using neutrality, since its features do not offer guidance to policy-
makers and its implications are scarcely predictable.54 It is not just 
article 9’s wording; it is also the case law that casts doubts on the 
opportunity of using neutrality. 
3. The opposition to the ECtHR’s use of neutrality 
The ECtHR’s use of neutrality is also contested for reasons that 
derive both from the ambiguity of neutrality itself and from its 
effects on national traditions.55 
Lautsi I was opposed by a vast number of countries that 
criticized the decision and joined Italy in the appeal before the 
Grand Chamber. Interestingly, almost all the countries that 
 
 49. Mark L. Movsesian, Crosses and Culture: State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the US 
and Europe, 1 OXFORD J.L. AND RELIGION, 338 (2012) (offering a synthetic depiction of 
neutrality in the ECtHR’s case law). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Gunn, supra note 14, at 419. 
 52. Act of Supremacy, supra note 31. 
 53. Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 63 (2008); see also 
Mirolubovs v. Latvia, App. No. 798/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 81 (2009); Murphy v. Ireland, App. 
No. 44179/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 73 (2003); Sidincatul “Pastorul Cel Bun” v. Romania, App. 
No. 2330/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61 (2013). 
 54. Some believe that the use of this principle has become even more ambiguous with 
the passing of time. Palomino, supra note 20, at 684. 
 55. See Temperman, supra note 37, at 126 (discussing the parallel need of the Human 
Rights Committee of not undermining its own legitimation through focusing on the religious 
freedom’s implications of establishment of religion). 
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supported the appeal were Eastern European;56 neutrality divided 
Europe almost literally on that occasion. It confirmed that the 
principle of neutrality is not a shared value throughout Europe, and 
that especially Orthodox legal culture is not at ease with it.57 
Moreover, the decision was criticized for being partisan. 
Professor Joseph Weiler, while advocating in favor of the display of 
the crucifix in Lautsi II,58 explained that neutrality is actually not 
neutral.59 Neutrality would be a legitimate, but not the only 
legitimate, way of understanding religious liberty and striking a 
balance between human rights and state-religion relationships. It 
would be a constitutional option, which would coexist with other, 
equally legitimate, options. 
Whether this reading of neutrality is correct or not, one thing 
can be stated quite easily: neutrality is not an appropriate foundation 
for the protection of religion and human rights. The first reason lies 
in its ambiguity: the way Lautsi I understood neutrality was opposite 
to the way Lautsi II understood it. The second reason is that it has 
as many supporters as detractors. Opponents of neutrality see it as a 
militant political philosophy and theory of religious liberty60—not 
just as a mere neutral device that simply reflects religious pluralism 
and religious freedom and that strikes a balance between religion, 
state, and human rights in complete accordance with article 9 of the 
European Convention. 
The shift away from a textualist reading of the European 
Convention and towards a political and philosophical reading of it is 
particularly evident when the ECtHR occasionally uses the terms 
neutrality and “secularism” interchangeably, indifferent to the 
 
 56. Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Russian Federation, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, 
Monaco, Romania, and the Republic of San Marino. See NICOLA COLAIANNI, DIRITTO 
PUBBLICO DELLE RELIGIONI. EGUAGLIANZA E DIFFERENZE NELLO STATO COSTITUZIONALE 
97 (il Mulino, 2012). 
 57. MASSIGNON & RIVA, supra note 12, at 269. 
 58. See the transcription at Oral Submission by Professor Joseph Weiler Before the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, ILSUSSIDIARIO.NET (July 1, 2010), 
http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/Politics-Society/2010/7/1/EXCLUSIVE-Oral-
Submission-by-Professor-Joseph-Weiler-before-the-Grand-Chamber-of-the-European-Court-
of-Human-Rights/96909/. 
 59. Id. See also Joseph H.H. Weiler, Il crocefisso a Strasburgo: una decisione 
“imbarazzante,” QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 148–52 (2010). 
 60. R. Palomino, supra note 20, at 671 (“Liberal neutrality is more inclined to favor 
secular or laical world views over religious ones.”). 
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distinct definition of each word. Though the ECtHR has decided 
cases on the basis of neutrality rather than “secularism,” some Judges 
of the ECtHR in their opinions have maintained that “secularism” is 
a principle that is commanded by the Convention and that needs to 
be enforced, safeguarded, and protected.61 “Secularism” is a 
trademark of countries like Turkey, and as I explained above, at the 
time the Convention was drafted, Turkey meant to foster human 
rights’ protection even at the expense of freedom of religion.62 
Turkey wasn’t really neutral: it was inclined to prefer human rights 
to religion and religious rights. 
Perhaps neutrality can be neutral. But as long as it is understood 
as a militant political philosophy with specific priorities, or just as a 
model of constitutionalism amongst the many, then it is not really 
neutral, but instead it is divisive. It is therefore understandable that 
even religious minorities living in states with an established religion 
hardly support constitutional changes that would eliminate the 
establishment63 because they might fall into the arms of non-neutral 
secularism. If the relationship between states, religions, and human 
rights were reassessed and aligned with the principle of neutrality, 
religious minorities believe that this realignment would happen at 
the expense of all religions, not just of the established one. 
Conversely, if neutrality is conceived in a nonsectarian way, it 
becomes ambiguous and its consequences are unpredictable. 
Since neutrality is an ambiguous word, the ECtHR’s adherence 
to the principle of neutrality seems quite unexplainable as being 
merely a consistent way to expound article 9 of the Convention. It is 
all but evident why the ECtHR has placed neutrality within the core 
of the conventional principles, since there is no trace in the text of 
the Convention and there is no consensus amongst the state parties 
on its existence and implications.64 
 
 61. Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (Tulken, J., 
dissenting). 
 62. ABDULLAH A.A. AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE 197 (2008). 
 63. REX AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 145 
(2005) (“[N]ot a single article or speech could be found by any non-Christian faith in favour 
of disestablishment. Rather, secular reformers have been using minorities (claiming the desire 
to accommodate them) to justify courses of action that these secular elites have decided upon 
by themselves to advance their own purposes.”). 
 64. I am using the categories that Charles H. Beitz has articulated in his book. 
CHARLES H. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 75–76 (2009). 
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B. The Secular-Christian European Union Debate 
A relevant legal debate that took place some years ago in Europe 
helps illuminate the reasons underpinning the adoption of neutrality 
by the European legal culture. It was the debate about the European 
Union’s identity and legacy at the moment the EU drafted a 
constitution. 
EU law has seldom addressed human rights issues directly, and 
has not grounded its legitimation upon them explicitly.65 The scope 
of EU law, however, is expanding to reflect an increasing interest in 
human rights and also to encompass religious freedom among its 
policies.66 In the EU context, ideas about neutrality, secularism, and 
religiosity were strongly debated at the momentous time of the 
drafting of the European Union’s constitutional text. Interestingly, 
those were the years in which, after the delivery of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union in 200067 and after 
experiencing the entrance of several post-Socialist Eastern European 
countries, the EU was wondering about its further expansion and the 
inclusion of Turkey. The EU was reflecting and pondering what kind 
of new constitutional framework was most needed.68 The 
Constitution was expected to consolidate the new status and set the 
premises for the EU’s future commitment to human rights. The 
drafting of a “new European Constitution” was meant to 
“contribute to European social integration, to enhance a common 
 
 65. J.H.H. Weiler, Deciphering the Political and Legal DNA of European Integration: 
An Exploratory Essay, in Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law 150 (J. Dickson, 
P. Eleftheriadis eds., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012).  
 66. See Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on the Promotion and Protection 
of Freedom of Religion or Belief, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting (24 June 2013), 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137585.pdf. 
Religious freedom is also protected by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, as incorporated in the Treaty on European Union, under art. No. 17: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. The right to conscientious objection is recognized, in accordance with the 
national laws governing the exercise of this right. 
 67. It was ratified December 7, 2000. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. 
 68. J.H.H. Weiler, Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg, available at 
https://infoeuropa.eurocid.pt/files/database/000036001-000037000/000036583.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
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European identity, and to remedy the deficit in democratic 
legitimacy,” which were commonly considered some of the weakest 
aspects of the EU entity.69 
The EU Constitution was later turned down as it took the more 
favored form of a Treaty.70 Nonetheless, the debates about what was 
appropriate to write in the EU Constitutional Preamble are still 
significant to understanding the debate between pro- and anti-
neutrality European scholars. The debate about the EU Constitution 
concerned the identity, the past, and the founding values of the EU 
and of modern Europe, but this debate was relevant for the future of 
the EU.71 The debate was about what should have been written in 
the Preamble, and about what had inspired the reconstruction of 
Europe after hundreds of years of wars.72 Although the debate did 
not lead to the delivery of an official text, that debate shed a light on 
the narratives that describe contemporary political Europe. 
The drafting of the Preamble initially led to a proposal that did 
not highlight the religious roots of the EU,73 but rather blended 
them into a broader, humanistic perspective: 
Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe, which, nourished first by the civilizations of 
Greece and Rome, characterized by spiritual impulse always present 
in its heritage and later by the philosophical currents of the 
Enlightenment, has embedded within the life of society its 
perception of the central role of the human person and his 
inviolable and inalienable rights, and of respect for law.74 
The focus was on humanism. Religions were left out of the text. 
Humanism was the key, the historical climax to which previous 
traditions—including Christianity—had contributed. Religions were 
 
 69. José Casanova, Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration, 
EUROZINE10 (June 29, 2004), http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2004-07-29-casanova-en.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
 70. See supra note 16. 
 71. J. HABERMAS, SOLIDARIETÀ TRA ESTRANEI: INTERVENTI SU FATTI E NORME 39 (L. 
Ceppa, Guerini e Associati, 1997) (noting that our identity has to do with our past as well as 
with our projects). 
 72. Casanova, supra note 69, at 3. 
 73. Text European Convention pmbl., May 28, 2003, Secretariat, CONV 722/03, 
available at http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/reg/en/03/cv00/cv00722.en03.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 16, 2013). 
 74. The European Convention, May 28, 2003, available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/b_290503.pdf. 
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important because they had nurtured the modern culture of human 
rights. That was the role of religions that could be valued; including  
religious traditions, or naming them in the Preamble, would have 
been discriminatory and clearly non-neutral.75 
Joseph Weiler opposed this view. In a small book, A Christian 
Europe,76 which was translated in several languages but never 
published for an English-speaking audience, Weiler advocated the 
role of religious culture in the shaping of contemporary Europe and 
stated that the overwhelmingly Christian culture needed to be 
openly recognized by the EU Constitution. If a Preamble was to be 
included in the Constitution, then it had to include Christianity 
among the EU inspirational movements. An inclusive constitutional 
text had to include Christianity, instead of excluding it for the sake 
of neutrality: its exclusion would have been ideological and divisive. 
Weiler was not alone. Some other prominent thinkers, such as 
José Casanova, supported the idea that the exclusion of religious 
views in the European Constitution was blatantly upholding a 
secularist (i.e., nonreligious), and therefore not neutral, ideal of 
Europe and of the Constitution, which turned “religion into a 
problem.”77 
Weiler’s proposal lost. The “neutral” version of it was adopted, 
albeit deeply modified: all the historical and philosophical references 
were dropped.78 When the constitutional project was replaced with 
what was called the Lisbon Treaty, the last version of the Preamble 
was substantially included in it.79 
Interestingly, Weiler’s proposal in A Christian Europe was 
responded to by Lorenzo Zucca’s A Secular Europe80 some years 
 
 75. SECULAR EUROPE, supra note 2, at 41. 
 76. JOSEPH WEILER, UN’EUROPA CRISTIANA. UN SAGGIO ESPLORATIVO (Rizzoli, 
2003). 
 77. J. Casanova, supra note 69, at 11. 
 78. European Convention Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 
2003, Secretariat, CONV 850/03, available at http://european-
convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf (“Drawing inspiration from the cultural, 
religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, the values of which, still present in its heritage, 
have embedded within the life of society the central role of the human person and his or her 
inviolable and inalienable rights, and respect for law.”). 
 79. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 15, at 10 (“DRAWING INSPIRATION from the 
cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the 
universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, 
democracy, equality and the rule of law.”). 
 80. SECULAR EUROPE, supra note 2. 
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later. Zucca addresses the problematic public role of religion in 
Europe, dealing with the issues of the EU’s identity as well as with 
the ECtHR’s case law. Zucca still advocates neutrality, although he 
insists that it should be understood in a practical, non-theoretical 
way. He argues that neutrality does not need to be articulated in a 
philosophical fashion, but only as a practical concept.81 Instead of 
being a belief, it should be just an attitude;82 it is just intended to 
protect European societies, since “religion is very much interested in 
the social game. It wants to conquer the people.”83 In Zucca’s 
theory, religion is trying to conquer the state and the society, and 
this could compromise the possibility of securing human rights’ 
effective respect in a pluralistic environment.84 It is worth noticing 
that, for Zucca, the only available answer to this threat would consist 
of a kind of neutrality made up of “inclusive secularism,”85 an 
expression that formally does not place any boundaries between 
neutrality and any anti-religious approach, and surely does not make 
it palatable to all European identities. 
Recently, Jürgen Habermas has emphasized the perils of 
misunderstanding neutrality and pushing religious people out of the 
public sphere against their will.86 With the end of the Iron Curtain 
and the intensification of intra-European cultural and political 
exchanges, the potential adverse impact of this misunderstanding has 
expanded to Eastern Europe. In fact, the processes of secularization 
that have dominated, in different shapes, Protestant and Catholic 
countries of Europe87 are largely unknown to the Orthodox world.88 
The Orthodox world is therefore not at ease with such categories of 
secularization, “secularism” and neutrality. All things considered, 
neutrality offers a vision that is not truly shared by the overwhelming 
European legal culture: it is conceived differently by countries that 
accept it, while it is even rejected by other European peoples. 
 
 81. Id. at 101. 
 82. Id. at 101. 
 83. Id. at 41. 
 84. Id. at 132 (“If the rule of law was contaminated by any type of cultural and religious 
influence it would hardly be capable of coping with diversity.”). 
 85. Id. at xx. 
 86. JÜRGEN HABERMAS & EDUARDO MENDIETA, LE RELIGIONI E LA POLITICA. 
ESPRESSIONI DI FEDE E DECISIONI PUBBLICHE 40 (2013). 
 87. J. Remy, Laïcité et construction de l’Europe, in RELIGIONS ET TRANSFORMATIONS 
DE L’EUROPE, 367–69 (G. Vincent & J.P. Willaime eds., 1993). 
 88. MASSIGNON & RIVA, supra note 12, at 269. 
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Therefore, it can be embraced by the European legal culture only if  
it is understood in a very loose sense. But, if this is the way it is 
conceived, it does not help in deciding cases. 
C. Non-Secular States Moving Towards Neutrality: The Case of Italy 
and Spain 
Interestingly, the success of the principle of neutrality is not 
confined to the supranational level. It can be traced also in some 
relevant national contexts. I will briefly consider here two state legal 
systems that made their own way towards neutrality, namely Italy and 
Spain, when they reshaped the relationship between the state and 
religion when they reflected on their human rights protections. While 
framing their own constitutional texts, they did not follow the model 
of the French Constitution,89 which required a strong separation of 
church and state.90 Nevertheless, Italy and Spain later utilized French 
concepts and wordings when they interpreted them.91 
During the Constitutional Assembly, the Italian Framers openly 
affirmed that they did want to mention the word “laicità,” the 
equivalent of French “laïcité,” which is oftentimes assimilated or at 
least strictly linked to neutrality.92 The Italian Framers avoided this 
word because they did not want to communicate any hostility 
towards religion.93 The constitutional commitment to human rights 
did not mean anti-religiosity. No other expression of somewhat 
equivalent meaning, such as neutrality, or “secularism,” was included 
in the text. 
More generally, both Italian94 and Spanish95 constitutionalism 
led to an open affirmation of religious freedom and human rights on 
 
 89. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.) (“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and 
social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of 
origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised on a decentralised 
basis.”). 
 90. Silvio Ferrari, Civil Religions: Models and Perspectives, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
749, 751 (2010). 
 91. R. Palomino, supra note 20, at 661. 
 92. J. Baubérot & M. Milot, Laïcités sans frontiers 77 (2011). 
 93. See the declaration of the Framer, Hon. Cevolotto, November 21, 1946, 418 of the 
Records of the First Subcommission of the Italian Constituent Assembly, available at 
http://www.camera.it/_dati/costituente/lavori/I_Sottocommissione/sed041/sed041.pdf. 
 94. Art. 7 COSTITUZIONE [Cost.] (It.) (“The State and the Catholic Church are 
independent and sovereign, each within its own sphere. Their relations are regulated by the 
Lateran pacts. Amendments to such Pacts which are accepted by both parties shall not require 
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an equal basis, as well as of a special relationship between the state 
and the Catholic faith. Nonetheless, the enactment of the 
constitutional texts in both states led the respective constitutional 
courts to explicitly mention the principle of neutrality.96 The Italian 
Constitutional Court did so starting in 1989,97 only after the end of 
the established church regime. In 1984, the pacts between the 
Catholic Church and the state were renewed and the established-
church regime, which had never been questioned after 1848 and had 
probably survived the drafting of the 1948 Constitution, was openly 
abandoned.98 The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal affirmed 
“neutralidad” (neutrality in Spanish) a little earlier, in 1981.99 The 
two states, which had refused to endorse the French model of 
neutrality at the time of drafting their constitutions,100 later followed 
France and borrowed the word neutrality.101 
The two courts’ declarations that their respective states are 
“neutral” say more than what the two states actually enforce. 
 
the procedure of constitutional amendments.”); id. at art. 8 (“All religious denominations are 
equally free before the law. Denominations other than Catholicism have the right to self-
organisation according to their own statutes, provided these do not conflict with Italian law. 
Their relations with the State are regulated by law, based on agreements with their respective 
representatives.”); id. at art. 19 (“Anyone is entitled to freely profess their religious belief in 
any form, individually or with others, and to promote them and celebrate rites in public or in 
private, provided they are not offensive to public morality.”). 
 95. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“Freedom of ideology, religion and 
worship is guaranteed, to individuals and communities with no other restriction on their 
expression than may be necessary to maintain public order as protected by law. No one may be 
compelled to make statements regarding his or her ideology, religion or beliefs. No religion 
shall have a state character. The public authorities shall take into account the religious beliefs of 
Spanish society and shall consequently maintain appropriate cooperation relations with the 
Catholic Church and other confessions.”). 
 96. Alessandro Ferrari, Laïcité et multiculturalisme à l’italienne, 141 ARCHIVES DE 
SCIENCES SOCIALES DES RELIGIONS 133, 133 (2008). 
 97. Corte cost., 12 aprile 1989, n. 203, Racc. uff. Corte cost. 
 98. Agreements made on February 18 and November 15, 1984 and executed with law 
no. 121 and 206 in 1985. Legge 25 marzo 1985, n. 121 (It.); Legge 20 maggio 1985, n. 206 
(It.). See the additional protocol to the February 18, 1984 Agreement, available at 
http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/USRI/confessioni/accordo_indice.html#3. 
 99. S.T.C. 005, 1981 (B.J.C., No. 5) (Spain), available at 
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/paginas/Sentencia.aspx?cod=16631. 
 100. Carmen Garcimartín Montero, La laicidad en las Cortes Constituyentes de 1978, 36 
IUS CANONICUM, 539, 558 (1996). 
 101. M.A. Roca, La neutralidad del Estado: fundamento doctrinal y actual delimitación 
en la jurisprudencia, IL DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO, 405–29 (1997); B. Randazzo, La Corte 
«apre» al giudizio di uguaglianza tra confessioni religiose?, GIURISPRUDENZA 
COSTITUZIONALE, 1843–67 (1998). 
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Neutrality is hardly descriptive of the constitutional balance between 
religious liberty, equality, and state impartiality that they have 
offered. Decisions and policies are not offered a clear guidance 
through this concept. Again, the display of the crucifix is a good 
example. In Italy, in 2000 the Italian Supreme Court (“Corte di 
Cassazione”) found the display of the crucifix in ballot rooms to be 
inconsistent with the state’s duty of neutrality;102 it did not order its 
removal only because it is not among its powers to issue such an 
order. In 2006, the Supreme Administrative Court (“Consiglio di 
Stato”), deciding the case that later brought the Lautsi controversy 
before the ECtHR, affirmed that it is reasonable to hang the crucifix 
in classrooms because it is not only consistent with the principle of 
neutrality, but it also represents the historical root of neutrality 
itself.103 In this latter Court opinion, Christian culture, with its 
command of giving what is God’s to God and what is Caesar’s to 
Caesar, provided the seeds for what would later develop as the 
culture of religious freedom and of separation between church 
and state.104 
In Spain, the display of the crucifix in public schools was 
discussed twice. The first decision found the display in violation of 
the principle of state neutrality;105 the appellate decision struck a 
different balance between religious freedom, neutrality and the 
display of the crucifix. It commanded that the display of the crucifix 
accommodate the students’ needs and, more concretely, the actual 
existence of opponents of such display.106 Classroom crucifixes 
needed to be removed only upon request of the students (or of their 
parents) who were actually attending classes in the relevant 
classrooms.107 On the contrary, crucifixes displayed in common 
rooms were under the sight of the general public and therefore had 
to be removed entirely.108 
These short examples of states that have made no textual 
reference to neutrality in their constitutions but that have endorsed it 
 
 102. Cass., IV sez. Penale (IV Penal Law session), 1 gennaio 2000, n. 439, available at 
http://web.unife.it/convegni/amicuscuriae/index_file/cassazione439.pdf. 
 103. Cons. Stato, sez. VI, 13 febbraio 2006, n. 556, Giur. it. 
 104. Id. 
 105. S. Juz. Cont. Adm., 2008 (J.T.S., No. 228) (Spain). 
 106. S.T.S.J., Dec. 14, 2009 (J.T.S.) (Spain). 
 107. Holding no. 1 of the judgment. 
 108. Holding no. 2 of the judgment. 
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in the decisions of their judges are of some interest. The circulation 
of neutrality proves the success of this concept; but its use is 
ambiguous. It is not clear why and how the Italian and the Spanish 
constitutional tribunals resolved to adopt this principle, 
notwithstanding its roots, which are hostile to religion. Nor has this 
principle been useful in deciding cases as is evident from the fact that 
neutrality has led to opposing decisions about the legitimacy of the 
display of the crucifix even within the same state. Its fortune 
probably contributed to the circulation of the concept of neutrality, 
but affected the clarity of its meaning. It has been endorsed and 
utilized by legal systems with different attitudes towards the 
relationship between church and state, religious freedom and law and 
religion, to the extent that its implications have become hardly 
predictable. 
Therefore, the success of the principle of neutrality needs 
clarification. The most needed clarification regards the reason that 
has led legal doctrine and courts to use it, notwithstanding all the 
criticism that such use has attracted. After all, the use of neutrality 
has been rightly criticized for being either elusive—think about 
Lautsi II109—or for being too rigid and close to French and Turkish 
secularism—think about Lautsi I.110 This leads us to the core of this 
article: the reasons behind the Europe-wide fortune of neutrality. 
II. WHY EUROPEAN LEGAL THOUGHT IS TRYING TO ENFORCE 
NEUTRALITY: THE QUEST FOR A EUROPEAN IDENTITY 
The reason for the successful expansion of the principle of 
neutrality cannot be found in the ECtHR as well as domestic Courts’ 
decisions. The decisions actually use neutrality but do not explain 
why they do so. 
It seems that neutrality keeps popping up in the case law of the 
ECtHR, in some domestic courts’ decisions, and in the debate about 
the historical and philosophical roots of Europe because the 
European legal culture is in search of a founding myth for its public 
philosophy and for its identity.111 The debate about the Preamble of 
the Constitution of Europe ended in a failure—the Preamble was 
 
 109. ECtHR Grand Chamber, supra note 19, at 229. 
 110. Zoe Luca, Religious Symbols in Public Schools and the (Lack of) Margin of 
Appreciation, 17 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 98 (2010). 
 111. R. Palomino, supra note 20, at 658. 
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largely emptied to make it palatable to different states’ cultures, and 
the Constitution’s project was finally supplanted with a more 
moderate Treaty. But the debate is still there: what constitute a 
European identity?112 What is the European model for the 
relationship between religion, state, and human rights?113 
This is a subject that has been raised by influential thinkers such 
as Jürgen Habermas, who has denounced the critical situation of a 
European culture that would have abdicated its great common ideals 
for a moderate, mild governance of economic and social problems.114 
Thinkers like Habermas believe that only a daring, philosophically 
committed European legal culture would be able to address the lack 
of great ideals and respond to the urgent need for a European 
“soul,” which would restore the solidarity amongst Europeans. And 
scholars such as John Milbank believe that only a pervasive Christian 
culture would be responsive to these needs and they therefore argue 
against the project of neutrality.115 
As fielded by Habermas, the problem of a shared understanding 
of a collective identity in the field of the relationship between church 
and state in Europe must be considered as merely a part of a huge 
debate about the role of European supranational institutions,116 on 
their ultimate goals, and on their effectiveness in enforcing a shared 
human rights’ policy in Europe.117 The identity of Europe is 
problematic not just regarding the relationship between religion and 
human rights, but also in the field of human rights itself. The 
recourse to neutrality must be understood as a part of a reliable 
response to the quest for European identity when it comes to the 
relationship between law, religion, human rights, and democracy 
broadly considered. 
This quest for an identity is not only a European issue. It can 
 
 112. J. Casanova, supra note 69, at 1. 
 113. Jean-Paul Willaime, La Sécularisation. Une Exception Européenne? Retour sur un 
concept et sa discussion en sociologie des religions, 47 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SOCIOLOGIE, 755, 
765 (2006). 
 114. For instance, see Jürgen Habermas, Bringing the Integration of Citizens into Line 
with the Integration of States, 18 EURO. L.J. 485, 486 (2012).  
 115. John Milbank, Shari’a and the True Basis of Group Rights, in SHARI’A IN THE WEST 
138 (Rex Ahdar & Nicholas Aroney eds., 2010); Remy, supra note 87, at 378. 
 116. Jürgen Habermas, Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis, available at 
http://www.kuleuven.be/communicatie/evenementen/evenementen/jurgen-
habermas/democracy-solidarity-and-the-european-crisis (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).  
 117. BEITZ, supra note 64, at 14. 
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also be found at a state level. States such as Italy or Spain have left 
established-church regimes behind. It is not by chance that both 
Italy and Spain introduced what they later called neutrality into their 
constitutional framework only after the end of the previous 
established or quasi-established religious regimes.118 The special 
relationship they had with Catholicism was a powerful tool of 
legitimization.119 After this special relationship was over, Italy and 
Spain started looking for another identity: something that would 
describe their contemporary constitutionalism with regard to 
religious liberty and other human rights. They thought they found it 
in the myth of neutrality. 
This exploration so far leads to the preliminary conclusion that 
neutrality must be understood as an attempt to respond to the quest 
for a European “soul;” this is why it has been widely and increasingly 
utilized, even though the state and supranational constitutional 
framework in Europe would be too poor and even contradictory to 
ground its use. 
Nonetheless, neutrality is not the right solution for this quest. 
Three reasons that have been explored lie behind this conclusion: (a) 
neutrality is not referenced in the text of the European Convention 
of Human Rights, in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, or in 
many state constitutions; (b) neutrality does not fit easily with the 
established-church regimes that populate Europe; and (c) the legal 
implications of neutrality are ambiguous. Therefore, I briefly explore 
an alternative solution here. 
III. THE SURVIVAL OF THE POST-WESTPHALIAN EUROPE AND THE 
INSUFFICIENCY OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
Had European legal culture looked for a substitute of neutrality, 
would they have found a real alternative in religious pluralism? After 
all, neutrality has oftentimes accompanied “religious pluralism,”120 at 
least in the ECtHR’s case law, as seen above. The contemporary 
European state should be serving and protecting religious pluralism 
 
 118. Gustavo Suárez Pertierra, Laicidad y cooperación como bases del modelo español: un 
intento de interpretación integral (y una nueva plataforma de consenso), 92 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA 
DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 41, 42–43 (2011). 
 119. R. Robertson, Globalization, Politics, and Religion, in THE CHANGING FACE OF 
RELIGION 19 (James A. Beckford & Thomas Luckmann eds., 1989). 
 120. See Silvio Ferrari, I simboli religiosi nello spazio pubblico, 2012 QUADERNI DI 
DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA 317, 327. 
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under article 9 of the European Convention, notwithstanding the 
fact that the wording of art. No. 9 does not mention “religious 
pluralism.” 
The ECtHR is not alone in fostering this idea of religious 
pluralism as the environment in which European states should find 
their place. A wide range of constitutional law scholars,121 political 
theorists, and even protagonists of the contemporary religious 
thinking122 have also supported reasonably similar ideas of a “plural 
society,” in which public institutions are expected to preserve and 
cherish religious pluralism as an important asset for European and 
national societies.123 A pluralistic society, which understands religious 
heterogeneity as a positive aspect of contemporary European 
democracies, has therefore been proposed as a model for 
contemporary European legal systems. Different voices have been 
speaking along these lines. 
Nonetheless, two reasons play against this identifying power of 
religious pluralism as a description of contemporary Europe as well 
as a legal concept that should be enforced at the state level. The first 
reason is that states are not religiously plural. Many of them are 
mainly composed of a vast religious majority, which is surrounded by 
a number of other small religions—increasingly so because of 
immigration—and by an increasing number of secularized people, 
who do not embrace any faith.124 More generally, “[t]hroughout 
Europe, historically dominant churches, even those churches that 
have been officially disestablished, continue to exert disproportionate 
social influence.”125 Actually, if one considers the majoritarian 
religions that populate Europe, they are still distributed along 
Westphalia Peace lines. Religious pluralism is not the veritable 
description of the current status of Europe; the usage of this 
expression within the ECtHR’s jurisprudence can be understood 
instead as a call on European citizens and institutions, to make them  
 
 121. Gustavo Zagrebelsky, Stato e Chiesa. Cittadini e cattolici, 2007 DIRITTO PUBBLICO 
697. 
 122. ANGELO SCOLA, UNA NUOVA LAICITÀ. TEMI PER UNA SOCIETÀ PLURALE (Marsilio, 
Padova, 2007). 
 123. Among many, see Kuznetsov v. Russia, App. No. 184/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 54 
(2007). 
 124. J. Casanova, supra note 69, at 10. 
 125. Mark L. Movsesian, Crosses and Culture: State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the US 
and Europe, 1 OXFORD J.L. AND RELIGION 338 (2012). 
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committed to protect religious freedom and to welcome the 
proliferation of religious minorities.126 
Religious pluralism is not well received by some states also for 
another reason. In some cases, religious identities are still understood 
as European states’ foundations. Even the recent dissolution of 
Yugoslavia has taken place along religious lines.127 Cyprus is still 
divided into two, both ethnically and religiously.128 Northern 
Ireland’s political conflict coupled the Protestant-Catholic conflict 
until recently.129 religious pluralism can be seen as problematic in 
these environments, since it can affect state identity and even 
regional stability. 
The German domestic struggle about the crucifix confirms that, 
where there is no religious homogeneity, religion becomes a matter 
of debate even within well-settled European states,130 whose survival 
and social equilibrium is not at stake. The presence of the crucifix in 
classrooms has recently been accommodated along religious lines. 
The southern, mostly Catholic, Bayer has traditionally allowed the 
display of the symbol. The predominantly Protestant regions do not 
 
 126. After the Peace of Westphalia (1648), “[f]or the next three hundred years, 
European societies continued exporting all their religious minorities overseas, while the 
confessional territorial boundaries between Catholic and Protestant and between Lutheran and 
Calvinist remained basically frozen until the drastic secularization of post-World War II 
European societies made those confessional boundaries seemingly irrelevant. 
In fact, without taking into account this long historical pattern of confessionalization of states, 
peoples and territories, it is not possible to understand the difficulties which every continental 
European state has, irrespective of the fact whether they have maintained formal establishment 
or are constitutionally secular, and the difficulties which every European society has, the most 
secular as well as the most religious ones, in accommodating religious diversity, and particularly 
in incorporating immigrant religions.16 It is true that in the last two hundred years all 
European states underwent some process of secularization and today all of them are formally 
and/or substantively secular. But the pattern of caesaro-papist regulation and control of 
religion established by the early modern confessional absolutist state, - by Catholic, Anglican, 
Lutheran, Calvinist, and Orthodox alike - has been maintained, basically unchallenged, until 
the present:” José Casanova, Public Religion Revisited, in RELIGION: BEYOND THE CONCEPT 
(Hent de Vries ed., 2008), available at http://dev.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/
default/ files/religionseminar_jcasanova.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2013). 
 127. VJEKOSLAV PERICA, BALKAN IDOLS. RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN YUGOSLAV 
STATES 3 (2002,); Grace Davie, RELIGION IN MODERN EUROPE. A MEMORY MUTATES 4 
(2002). 
 128. ACHILLES C. EMILIANIDES, RELIGION AND LAW IN CYPRUS 60 (2011). 
 129. TONY FAHEY, BERNADETTE C. HAYES, R & RICHARD SINNOTT, CONFLICT AND 
CONSENSUS: A STUDY OF VALUES AND ATTITUDES IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND AND 
NORTHERN IRELAND 75 (2005). 
 130. J. Casanova, supra note 69, at 2. 
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permit such display.131 And the Federal Constitutional Court, when 
asked to address this topic, took what has been defined as a 
“Protestant” approach;132 namely, the Court affirmed state neutrality 
and added that the display of the crucifix in public places would 
profane the religious meaning of the symbol133 (interestingly, this 
argument has been used in Protestant environments, whereas it is 
quite uncommon within Catholic culture).134 In the aftermath of the 
Federal Court’s decision, Bayer has accommodated the presence of 
the crucifix, but substantially kept it. The German legal culture is 
therefore somewhat divided along religious lines. 
The real historical alternative to a homogeneous religious 
environment has been to get away from religion: namely, to enforce 
a rigid separation—or even a control—of the state towards 
religions.135 This is obviously the case in France, but it is also the 
case in Turkey, whose republic was born out of internal conflicts 
within different strands of Islamic political doctrine.136 
But the exportation of the model of neutrality, from secularist 
countries like France to other European States and to all of 
Europe—through European Union law and the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence—has proven to be delusive for several reasons. It does 
not respect the phrasing of the European Convention, nor does it 
mirror the constitutional identity of several European states. And 
even genuine supporters of neutrality probably would not recognize 
Lautsi II as a decision that respects this principle. 
Neutrality, as a distinct secularist political and legal identity, can 
 
 131. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 28 (2011) (“In Germany the 
Federal Constitutional Court has ruled that a similar Bavarian ordinance was contrary to the 
principle of the state’s neutrality and difficult to reconcile with the freedom of religion of 
children who were not Catholics (16 May 1995; BVerfGE 93, 1). The Bavarian parliament 
then issued a new ordinance maintaining the previous measure, but enabling parents to cite 
their religious or secular convictions in challenging the presence of crucifixes in the classrooms 
attended by their children and introducing a mechanism whereby, if necessary, a compromise 
or a personalised solution could be reached.”). 
 132. Francesco Patruno, Riflessioni sul valore delle pronunce straniere in tema di 
esposizione del crocifisso, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI (Nov. 30, 2003), available at 
www.forumcostituzionale.it. 
 133. Francesco Patruno, Crocifisso, giurisprudenza straniera e laicità, available at 
www.olir.it (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 134. Paolo Cavana, La questione del crocifisso in Italia, available at www.olir.it (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 135. BAUBÉROT & MILOT, supra note 3, at 70. 
 136. AN-NA’IM, supra note 62 at 199. 
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play this role in countries that have clearly embraced it, not in those 
that are not familiar with it. Such countries would not accept it for 
themselves or at a continental level. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is not a given that an alternative to neutrality is really 
necessary. The shaping of a shared European identity does not need 
to encompass all the aspects that characterize European states, 
including religion and religious freedom. After all, even the EU did 
not want to replicate a state at a bigger level, imposing a single 
standardized model of statehood to all the state parties.137 The EU 
experiment strived to create a new level of government, whose 
components do not necessarily parallel those of states. 
A fresh look at the concept of religious pluralism can provide a 
framework for the European quest for identity in the religious field. 
Religious pluralism can play this role, insofar it is not understood as 
applicable at the state level. Single states could find religious 
pluralism a concept hard to handle. 
Religious pluralism presupposes heterogeneity and therefore 
cannot play the integrating role that each single religion did in 
shaping modern European states. But it can still have a role in 
shaping the European identity, precisely because the identity of 
Europe is not to be compared to the states’ identities.138 Europe is 
new in this respect. EU and the European Council’s institutions 
were born out of peoples that did not want to annihilate each other 
in the name of a specific identity or national sovereignty.139 They 
wanted to be inclusive and therefore avoided cutting off each other’s 
identities. Europe needs a new understanding of its relationship with 
religion because it needs an understanding of human rights that is 
 
 137. Armin von Bogdandy, Doctrine of Principles, Jean Monnet Working Paper 9, 2003, 
available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/03/030901-01.pdf (last 
visited Oct.  14, 2014). 
 138. Democracy, supra note 116, at 488 “(“Neither can this cautious posture be justified 
with the familiar arguments that all integration efforts are ultimately condemned to failure by 
the lack of a European people or the lack of a European public. Concepts such as nation or 
Volk evoke images of homogeneous macrosubjects. [. . .] What we have to recto with in 
Europe today are not imaginary peoples but concrete nation-states, linguistic diversity and 
national publics.”). 
 139. Charles F. Sabel & Oliver Gerstenberg, Constitutionalising an Overlapping 
Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order¸ 16 EUR. L.J. 511, 
512 (2010). 
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inclusive of different human rights’ national standards and “does not 
rest on mutual agreement on any single, comprehensive moral 
doctrine embracing ideas of human dignity, individuality or the 
like”140 that can be easier found on a state scale. Religious pluralism 
could be part of the fabric of the European identity that European 
legal culture is looking for.141 
If religious pluralism is taken seriously by the European legal 
culture at the Continental level, then states can also learn from it.142 
The states were born out of religious crucibles, but are facing 
growing secularization and immigration.143 Perhaps they could 
prospectively look at Europe to draw inspiration to adjust their 
identity to new demands of inclusion coming from cultures they are 
not familiar with. If Europe is able to take religious pluralism on as 
part of its own identity, then perhaps states can learn and imitate it 
voluntarily. If not, Europe (both the EU and the ECtHR) will 
probably enforce rights and political agendas based on a rather 
selective neutrality, which does not really incorporate “religious 
pluralism,” but which leads to the “refusal to have religion stand as 
the symbol of national identity” (an identity that defines many 
European countries),144 and which leans towards a “secularized 
religion of humanity”145 that tends to replace religious values with 
other abstract values.146 
Since there is no agreement on the meaning of “secularism” and 
on its connection with neutrality, and since the use of neutrality is 
associated with a political ideal that characterizes only some of the 
European states,147 enforcing neutrality through EU and the ECtHR 
would not be conducive to the implementation of a shared European 
identity. Rather, enforcing neutrality would be detrimental. 
The same risk can be run if the European legal culture pushes for 
 
 140. Id. at 513. 
 141. Peter G. Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 663, 745 (2011). 
 142. PETER HÄBERLE, COSTITUZIONE E IDENTITÀ CULTURALE. TRA EUROPA E STATI 
NAZIONALI 13 (2006) (reflects upon a pluralism of identities that would be characteristic both 
of Europe and of the modern constitutional states). 
 143. Casanova, supra note 69, at 6. 
 144. András Sajó, Preliminaries to a Concept of Constitutional Secularism, 6 3–4, INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 605, 629 (2008). 
 145. Democracy, supra note 116. 
 146. BAUBÉROT & MILOT, supra note 2, at 12. 
 147. J. Remy, supra note 88, at 367. 
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the enforcement of religious pluralism at a state level: religious 
pluralism is not a given for many European states, and can even 
jeopardize their stability, if it is imposed on them. If the EU and the 
ECtHR impose religious pluralism on themselves, and understand that 
the European quest for identity is inherently pluralistic and does not 
coincide with embracing a single church and state model, then they 
can both respect state identity and itself in a newer, more respectful, 
fashion. They can even inspire states’ evolution, delicately pushing 
them towards the implementation of “religious pluralism.” After all, 
the fortune of EU rests on “a political culture which internalizes, 
especially public authorities, obedience to the law rather than to 
expediency,” on a rather voluntary basis, not on “a gun or 
coercion.”148 If this has happened so far with regards to the shaping 
of EU, it could work also with “religious pluralism.” 
 
 
  
 
 148. Weiler, supra note 65, at 154.  
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